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Mars New Zealand Ltd v Heinz Watties Ltd 
[2012] NZHC 591 
Both the appellant, Mars, and the respondent, Heinz Watties, 
manufactured food products, including dog food. Mars sought 
to register the trade mark "ADVANCE ADVANCED PET 
NUTRITION" in Class 31. Heinz Watties had existing reg-
istered trade marks incorporating the word "CHAMP" and 
the word "ADVANCED", with a series of CHAMP ADVANCED 
DOG NUTRITION device marks. Heinz Watties opposed 
Mars' application for registration and the Assistant Commis-
sioner upheld that opposition. In this case, Mars appealed 
successfully to the High Court. 
Heinz Watties opposed registration on three grounds, 
under ss 17(I)(a), (b) and 2S(I)(c) of the Trade Marks 
Act 2002. The Assistant Commissioner upheld the Heinz 
Watties opposition on the basis of ss 17(I)(a) and 2S(I)(c). 
The Court adopted the Assistant Commissioner's analysis 
of the relevant legal principles, and applied it to the facts. In 
relation to s 17(I)(a), the Court identified the following 
questions: 
(1) Does the "ADVANCED DOG NUTRITION" element 
of the CHAMP trade mark have a reputation in the 
relevant market? 
(2) Do the words "ADVANCED DOG NUTRITION" 
have any trade mark significance? 
(3) How do the appellant's and respondent's trade marks 
compare? 
(4) What is the likelihood of confusion if the appellant's 
trade mark is allowed? 
On the first question, whether the "ADVANCED DOG 
NUTRITION" element of the CHAMP trade mark had a 
reputation in the relevant market, the Judge held that Heinz 
Watties had a well established reputation for its CHAMP 
brand amongst a substantial number of persons in the rel-
evant market, but that the trade mark as a whole was not 
well known, for three principal reasons: 
(1) The words "ADVANCED DOG NUTRITION" are 
insignificant relative to the size of the CHAMP text in 
the device. The words "ADVANCED DOG NUTRI-
TION" are so comparatively small that they are unlikely 
to be noticed by persons in the relevant market. 
(2) The words "ADVANCED DOG NUTRITION" are 
descriptive. 
(3) There was no evidence to support the Assistant Com-
missioner's findings that the words" ADVANCED DOG 
NUTRITION" have independent significance. 
On the second question, the Judge held that there was no 
evidence before the Assistant Commissioner to allow her to 
conclude that the words "ADVANCED DOG NUTRI-
TION" had ceased to be descriptive and had taken on a trade 
mark meaning. 1 
On the third question, comparing the appellant's and 
respondent's trade marks, the Judge compared the marks, 
focusing on the visual appearance and sound of the marks, 
and the idea behind the marks. The Judge then considered the 
likelihood of confusion, concluding that the visual, aural and 
conceptual differences between the appellant's and the respon-
dent's marks were such that it was highly unlikely there 
would be any confusion in the minds of those in the relevant 
market place, and nor was there any likelihood of anyone in 
the market place being deceived. The Judge also said that the 
Assistant Commissioner did not give sufficient consideration 
to the appellant's rights in its registered ADVANCE trade 
mark. 
In relation to s 17(1)(b), the Judge said that the parties 
were in agreement that the threshold set by s 17(1)(b) of the 
Act was higher than that for s 17(1) (a), so that findings either 
wayons 17(I)(a) made it unnecessary to consider the s 17(I)(b) 
grounds of appeal. The Judge nevertheless considered whether 
s 17(I)(b) applied, and found no basis for an objection under 
the section. 
The Judge went on to consider s 2S(I)(c), identifying the 
issues as: 
(1) Is the appellant's trade mark identical or similar to one 
or more of the marks of the respondent, or was an 
essential element of the appellant's trade mark identi-
calor similar to that which is well known? 
(2) Are the appellant's goods the same as or similar to the 
respondent's goods? 
(3) Would use of the appellant's goods using its trade mark 
be taken as indicating a connection in the course of 
trade with the respondent's goods? 
(4) If the answer to questions (1) and (2) or (3) is yes, 
would use of the appellant's trade mark be likely to 
prejudice the interests of the respondent? 
The Judge held that the appellant's trade mark was not 
identical or similar to one or more of the marks of the 
respondent, nor was an essential element of the appellant's 
trade mark identical or similar to that of the respondent's 
which was well known. The Judge found that the appellant's 
goods were the same as or similar to the respondent's goods, 
but that if the appellant used its trade mark in a fair and 
1. British Sugar pIc v James Robertson & Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 281 (Ch), 286. 
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natural way then there was little likelihood of there being any 
connection in the course of trade between the appellant's and 
respondent's products. The Judge said that if necessary he 
would also have concluded that there was no likelihood of 
prejudice to the respondent by the appellant using its trade 
mark in a fair and natural way. The only potential prejudice 
suggested by the respondent was that of confusion, and he 
had concluded that there was no realistic risk of confusion 
arising in this case. 
The Judge allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant 
was entitled to registration. 
GeoSmart Maps Ltd v GoSmart Foundation Ltd 
HC Auckland CIV 2011-404-003119,2 September 2011 
This was an oral judgment in an action in passing off and 
breach of the Fair Trading Act 1986. 
The plaintiff, GeoSmart, successfully sought an injunction 
to restrain the defendants from using the name "goSmart". 
At an earlier stage GoSmart was advised that unless steps 
were taken GeoSmart would be entitled to judgment. No 
steps were taken by GoSmart. 
GeoSmart was a designer and supplier of maps, mapping 
services, collector and supplier of business and locality data, 
supplier of driving directions and directory services. The 
Judge said that it was well-known in New Zealand and 
internationally, with business relationships in many coun-
tries. It had a significant reputation in the fields of its busi-
ness. 
GoSmart was a start-up company, operating since Janu-
ary 2011, which sought to create an identical product to that 
of GeoSmart displaying business points of interest over web 
maps supplied by Google. The Judge said that the two names 
were obviously similar and there was evidence of actual 
confusion. 
The Judge held on the evidence that the elements of 
passing off were established. GeoSmart had acquired good-
will and a reputation in the market known through its name, 
GeoSmart. GoSmart, by use of a confusingly similar name in 
the same area of business had led and was likely to continue 
to lead the public to believe that its services were the services 
of GeoSmart. GeoSmart was likely to suffer loss of customers 
if GoSmart was not restrained. 
The Judge also applied s 9 of the Act, finding that GoSmart, 
in trade, used a confusingly similar name to that of GeoSmart, 
and that a substantial section df the public would be misled. 
This constituted misleading and deceptive conduct for the 
purposes of the Act. 
The Judge ordered an injunction restraining the first defen-
dant from using the name and logo "goSmart" in any manner 
and from using and continuing to use any website with 
reference to goSmart. 
Fisher & Paykel Financial Services Ltd 
v Karum Group LLC (No.2) 
[2012] NZHC 240 
This judgment was concerned only with one cause of action 
in a counterclaim. The defendant, Karum, claimed that the 
plaintiff, FPF, infringed its copyright in a software program 
known as CMS, an acronym for credit management systems. 
At issue was the interpretation of documents Karum relied 
on to establish ownership of copyright in the software, and 
therefore standing to assert a claim of copyright infringe-
ment. 
New Zealand Intellectual Property Journal July 2012 
IP ROUND-UP: RECENT DECISIONS FROM THE COURTS 
The Judge considered a partnership agreement, a licence 
agreement and a dissolution agreement following the bank-
ruptcy of the two parties to the other agreements. The 
partnership agreement was between two United States com-
panies, PRJ& and ZRCM2 Inc, a subsidiary of Zale, who 
agreed to form a partnership to enhance, further develop and 
market the CMS software that Zale had developed. Under 
the licence agreement, Zale granted a licence to the partner-
ship. Karum argued that the wording of the partnership 
agreement and license appeared to grant a licence, but that 
there was in substance an assignment of the title to the CMS 
software to the partnership. The Judge did not accept this 
interpretation, finding that the wording of the two docu-
ments pointed unambiguously to a licence. 
The Judge then considered the dissolution agreement, 
which granted a new licence to the original software to each 
partner on the terms and conditions of the original licence, 
and rights to use the enhanced CMS software. The Judge did 
not accept the argument for Karum that these new licences 
were in substance assignments of the original software. 
The Judge therefore concluded that the documents granted 
licences of the original and enhanced software. Karum's 
claim that the documents assigned copyright was not success-
ful. 
Hamilton Maps Ltd v Hamilton News Operating 
as a Division of APN News & Media Ltd 
DC Hamilton CIV 2011-019-000874,9 March 2012 
This was a District Court decision on copyright infringe-
ment. The defendant conceded copyright infringement, and 
the issues were the nature of the breach and quantum of 
damages. 
The defendant was the publisher of "Hamilton News", a 
community newspaper. It asked the Hamilton City Council 
for a map of Hamilton to use for a show home guide, and the 
Council provided a link to a downloadable map. The Coun-
cil did not advise that the plaintiff owned the copyright in the 
map. From 19 November to 1 0 December 2010 the "Hamilton 
News" published on four occasions a portion of a map in 
which the plaintiff owned copyright. On 10 December 2010 
the plaintiff contacted the defendant to advise that it owned 
the copyright and to seek payment of $1000, but the defen-
dant declined to pay. On 17 December 2010 the defendant 
published a different map, which the plaintiff claimed still 
infringed, but the defendant denied that this map infringed. 
The Judge found copyright infringement in relation to the 
four publications of the plaintiff's map, but held that the 
plaintiff had not proved infringement in relation to the map 
published on 17 December 2010. 
The plaintiff claimed compensatory damages of $17,250 
plus additional damages of $3450 for the flagrancy of the 
breach. The defendants argued that its infringement was 
innocent and that under s 121 (1) the plaintiff was not entitled 
to damages. The Judge held that s 121(1) did not apply as it 
had not been proved or admitted that the defendant had no 
reason to believe that copyright existed in the work. The 
defendant was therefore liable for damages. The Judge awarded 
compensatory damages of $1000 per issue plus GST, total-
ling $4600. The Judge declined to award additional dam-
ages, holding that the breach was not of such a flagrant 
nature as to justify additional damages and that the breach 
arose out of a mistaken (albeit unjustified) belief that it had 
authorisation to use the map. (Infringement by authorisation 
was not argued in the case). 
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BayCity Technologies Ltd v Uttinger and 
DairySense LLC 
HC Auckland CIY 2006-404-7709, 21 March 2012 
This was an application by BayCity for revocation of a patent 
of which DairySense was the proprietor. DairySense brought 
a counterclaim for patent infringement by BayCity as a 
contributory infringer though its sale and dealing in the 
UAD4 data logger. This judgment related to an application 
by DairySense for orders for further and better discovery, for 
orders that BayCity answer interrogatories, and an order 
requiring BayCity to make available for inspection a UAD4 
data logger and software intended for use with the logger. 
The DairySense patent related to a system for sensing and 
collecting information about the parameters of milk in a milk 
vat, for example volume, milk temperature. It also related to 
allocating processing to milk collected from a vat containing 
such a sensor. 
BayCity marketed its UAD4 as a remote data logger for 
use in a range of industries including an automated milk 
monitoring system for use in milk vats. DairySense alleged 
that the UAD4 was used by Fonterra as primary infringer 
(although the identity of Fonterra as primary infringer was 
not disclosed in the pleadings), and that BayCity was a 
contributory infringer by selling its product as being capable 
of being used to transmit such information to a milk process-
ing company. 
The Judge set out the legal principles. Part 22 of the High 
Court Rules provided particular rules for regulatory proceed-
ings commenced in connection with patents. Rule 22.22 
provided that in a proceeding for infringement of a patent, 
the plaintiff must deliver particulars of the breaches relied on 
with the plaintiff's statement of claim, and give at least one 
instance of each type of infringement. Rule 22.24 provided 
that a party may not (without leave of the Court) be heard or 
adduce evidence in support of an alleged infringement if it 
relates to matters that are not specified in, or at variance 
with, the particulars that person has delivered. The Judge 
said that these rules were clearly directed to restricting dis-
covery and trial to the specific instances or infringement 
alleged and particularised, to avoid unnecessary expense and 
delay. The Judge said that the counterclaim was not an action 
for infringement of a patent but an action based on the tort of 
procuring an infringement by others, so that it was arguable 
that these rules did not apply. The Judge said that whatever 
the true characterisation of the action for contributory infringe-
ment, the policy underlying the rules governing pleading of 
infringement actions applied with equal force, and informed 
the assessment of the particulars required of an allegation of 
contributory infringement, even if the issue was considered 
in the context of the usual rules as to requirement for 
particularity in pleading contained in High Court Rule 5.26. 
The Judge said that there was no liability in New Zealand 
for merely facilitating infringement although the Patents Bill 
would create such liability. The allegations would be deter-
mined solely under the common law. The Judge said that a 
contributory infringer was one who, in some way, procured 
or induced an infringement of the patent by another. To 
contribute in this way to an infringement; there must be a 
primary infringer, and it was not enough to constitute con-
2. Townsend v Haworth (1875) 48 LJ ChD 770. 
898 
tributory infringement to merely facilitate the primary infringe-
ment. This meant that the sale of an item knowing that it was 
to be used in an infringing way was not sufficient to make out 
a contributory infringement.2 The Judge said that, even if 
DairySense was able to prove that the system marketed and 
sold by BayCity could be used for no purpose other than an 
infringing purpose, that would not, without more, constitute 
contributory infringement as such a system could neverthe-
less be disposed of without infringement. The purchaser 
might for example export the system. DairySense did not 
allege that the UAD4 data logger was incapable of a non-
infringing use in New Zealand. 
In relation to DairySense's applications, the Judge said 
that the application for further and better discovery and for 
interrogatories was couched in such general terms as to be 
objectionable on that ground alone. It was so broadly expressed 
as to capture material not even related to the dairy industry, 
and was a fishing exercise not tied to a pleading. 
The Judge said that BayCity was entitled to particulars of 
the identity of the primary infringer; particulars of the infringe-
ment alleged, and also particulars of BayCity's acts of pro-
curement or inducement. DairySense could not seek discovery 
or issue interrogatories, or seek rights of inspection, in reli-
ance upon unmade or unparticularised allegations. In light of 
this, the Judge held that DairySense could not succeed with 
this application for further discovery, nor its application that 
the interrogatories be answered. In relation to the applica-
tion for an order for inspection of the UAD4 data logger, 
DairySense sought the right to disassemble the product, 
which would render that product unsaleable. As the func-
tionality of the UAD4 data logger seemed clear cut and not at 
issue, the Judge declined that application. In relation to the 
request for a sample of each version of software intended for 
use with the UAD4 data logger, the Judge said that that was 
also too broad. The UAD4 data logger was used for many 
purposes. BayCity did not oppose access to software intended 
for use with the UAD4 data logger in connection with 
measurement of parameters in relation to milk, so long as 
adequate protections were put in place to meet concerns 
about providing a product to a potential competitor. The 
Judge said that the parties should attempt to agree a proper 
basis for the inspection to take place to meet BayCity's 
concerns regarding confidentiality. 
The Judge held that the applications for further and better 
discovery, for orders that BayCity answer interrogatories and 
for inspection of the UAD4 data logger were declined, and 
made no order in relation to the application for inspection of 
software pending further discussion between the parties. 
Stewart v Franmara Inc 
[2012] NZHC 548 
The plaintiff, Mr Stewart, invented and patented a bottle 
opener that extracted the cork, wire restraint and foil wrap-
ping from champagne bottles. The defendant, a United States 
company, expressed an interest in the opener, signed a confi-
dentiality agreement (governed by New Zealand law) and 
inspected the opener, offering US$2500 for a licence. Mr Stewart 
declined and made other distribution arrangements. The 
defendant nevertheless distributed the Stewart designed bottle 
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opener. The plaintiff brought this action, alleging breach of 
the confidentiality agreement, infringement of the plaintiff's 
New Zealand and United States patents, and breach of the 
Business and Professions Code of California. The matter was 
dealt with by way of formal proof, the defendant had been 
served but had taken no steps to defend the claims. The Judge 
issued an interim judgment in respect of the first two causes 
of action, reserving leave for the plaintiff to file further 
submissions on the third and fourth causes of action. 
The Judge reviewed the facts and evidence, finding that 
the defendant was marketing a bottle opener that in design, 
shape, style and operation was a replication of the plaintiff's 
invention. These bottle openers were being manufactured 
and/or marketed by the defendant without the plaintiff's 
consent. The defendant was marketing the openers through 
its website. The Judge said that "online distribution occurs in 
nations which have access to the world-wide web, including 
New Zealand and the United States". The Judge held that the 
defendant's actions amounted to a breach of the confidenti-
ality agreement and an infringement of the New Zealand 
patent. 
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The Judge said that the defendant's sales could only be 
estimated on the evidence available. The plaintiff's evidence 
was that the defendant's activities prevented the plaintiff 
from successfully distributing in the United States. The esti-
mated sales potential was 440,000 per annum worldwide 
and the Judge found a fair royalty to be around NZ$1.00 per 
opener. 
The Judge considered the other two causes of action, 
infringement of the United States patent and breach of the 
Business and Professions Code of California. In relation to 
both causes of action, the Judge reserved the question of 
jurisdiction for further argument if required. 
The Judge held that the confidentiality agreement was 
wilfully breached, and the plaintiff had suffered resulting loss 
and damage in lost revenue from sales and potential sales. 
The Judge also held that the New Zealand patent was wil-
fully infringed, with resulting losses. The Judge said that the 
plaintiff was entitled to damages by reference to a reasonable 
royalty, being a sum ofUS$864,SOO, plus interest, and costs. 
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